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WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE.
0N- the authority of Com. v. Child, 10 Pick. 252, and Swift v.
Ste~ens, 8 Conn. 431; it is said' by' Mr. Wharton, in his work on
Criminal Lrw, that a judge has a right -to. express his opinion to
the jury, on the weight of' evidence.
Whiatever may be. the law in Massachusetts and Connecticut,
the weight of judicial authority in Pennsylvania is believed to be
against the exercise of such right, if indeed, it does not deny its
existence. Judge Baldwin, in' his charge to the jury, in United
Stateg v. Braddee, says: "You will decide, as to credibility-uipoti
what we. dare not touch. We are bound to take evidence as true,-
you may do as you please, -as. to believing or disbelieving the best
man in society; the whole, case is ope4 to you." True, evidence
may be credible, and yet have but very little weight; but it cer-
tainly cannot have much weight without credibility. So far, then,
as the weight of evidence depends upon its..credibility, the language
of Judge Baldwin clashes with the highly respectable authorities of
Massachusetts and Connecticut. As ar, histance-of practice, how-
ever, it is worthy of observation, that the distinguished New York
I Wharton's Criminal Law, Ed. 1852, p. 883.
WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE.
Judge-who presided in the celebrated case of the People v.
.fcCleod, distinctly and unequivocally told the jury, that one of
the witnesses had sworn falsely.1 But the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania coincide with Judge Baldwin; and they have re-
cognized a more stringent rule than that of the Braddee case.
It is proper, however, to observe, that the Supreme Court of
New York &e sound on intervention in such cases. They admin-
ister the following just and dignified rebuke to the judge, who
presided at the trial of McCleod: "Whether the facts alleged are
true, is the proper and only province of the jury." .People v.
M Cleod, 1 Hill, 436.
Judge Bell, of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, says, that
the value of proof must be determined by the jury. (Burns v.
Sutherldnd, 7 Barr, 106.) And this was not a mere, dictum. The
principal point ruled in that case was, that the jury are to deter-
mine whether the facts are sufficiently established. And is not
Judge 'Bell's expression, value of proof, essentially and in every
sense, equivalent to the expression, weight of evidence ? In
another case, however, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania use
the identical expression, and adopt the actual converse of the New
England rule, as given by Mr. Wharton. The weight of evidence,
in regard to particular facts, is not niatter for the Court to charge
upon. (Brittain v. Doyle8town Bank, 5 Watts & Serg., 87, 100.)
It is submitted whether the Pennsylvania'authorities are hot in
accordance with the theory and spirit of the institution of trial by
jury. Let the Court exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all ques-
tions of law, and let the jury alone dispose of all questions of fact.
And such appears to be the better opinion even in Massachusetts,
notwithstanding the case of Corn. v. Child.
In a recent case, Chief Justice Shaw says: "It would be like
g usurpation of authority and violation of duty, for a Court, in a
jury trial, to decide authoritatively on the questions of fact, and for
the jury to decide ultimately and authoritatively upon the questions
of law." "This, as a general principle, is applicable alike to civil
and criminal cases." Com. v Porter, 10 Met, 286. C.C.
I See Pamphlet Trial.
